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  This paper estimates the value of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) subsidy. Using data from the 
merger boom of 1991-2004, we find that banking organizations were willing to pay an added 
premium for mergers that would put them over the asset sizes that are commonly viewed as the 
thresholds for being TBTF. We estimate at least $14 billion in added premiums for the eight 
merger deals that brought the organizations to over $100 billion in assets.  In addition, we find 
that both the stock and bond markets reacted positively to these deals.  Our estimated TBTF 
subsidy is large enough to create serious concern, since recent assisted mergers have allowed  
TBTF organizations to become even bigger and for nonbanks to become part of TBTF banking 
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How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-to-Fail  
and to Become Systemically Important? 
 
 
I.  Introduction and Background 
 
Too-big-to-fail (TBTF) has become a heated topic of debate in the last few years (see 
Stern, 2009a, 2009b, Stern and Feldman, 2009, and Kaufman 1990, 1991, and 2002). Should 
some financial institutions get special treatment from regulators and be perceived by the public 
as being TBTF?  How big does an institution have to be in order to be considered TBTF?  
Should the public be informed about which financial institutions are TBTF?  In return for their 
special privilege, should TBTF institutions be regulated differently?  How much is it worth for a 
financial institution to become TBTF?   
Prior to the financial crisis that started in mid-2007 and extended into 2009, there were 
debates about whether the TBTF policy, which was introduced by bank regulators in 1984 
following the Continental Illinois crisis, was completely eliminated by the implementation of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991. The question of 
whether some institutions, even after  FDICIA, may still be TBTF has become trivial in light of 
the dollars the federal government has recently poured into bailing out those banking 
organizations  considered TBTF and/or too interconnected (e.g., Bear Stearns, American 
International Group [AIG], Citigroup, and Bank of America).  It is evident that the TBTF policy is 
at work in the financial crisis, since these large financial organizations have been receiving 
special treatment and support.
1 An examination of the stock market’s reaction to the U.S. 
government’s Troubled Asset Relief Program’s (TARP) injection of capital into 10 large banking 
organizations around October 14, 2008 finds that the cumulative abnormal stock returns are 
large, positive, and statistically significant not only for the banks included in the initial TARP 
                                                 
1  Bear Stearns was given financial assistance prior to its acquisition by JPMorgan Chase.  Through 
TARP funds, American International Group (AIG), Citigroup, and Bank of American have received $85 
billion, $50 billion, and $45 billion, respectively, in capital injection from the U.S. Treasury and FRBNY   2
assistance but also for those large banks that were not included (see Panel A of Table 1).  For 
the portfolio of smaller publicly traded banking organizations whose  total assets’ book value is  
between $5 billion and $10 billion, the cumulative abnormal returns are positive but 
indistinguishably different from zero. For the portfolio of the smallest publicly traded banking 
organizations whose total assets’ book value is between $1 billion and $5 billion, the cumulative 
abnormal returns are also positive and statistically insignificant. 
While FDICIA attempted to make it more difficult for the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) to protect uninsured depositors and creditors at  large failing banking 
organizations and TBTF banking organizations, it is evident that the TBTF policy still  exists.  In 
fact, one might argue that FDICIA has actually formalized the process for bailing out TBTF 
banking organizations by specifically allowing a TBTF bailout when the banking organization’s 
failure “would have serious adverse effects on the economic conditions or financial stability” of 
the economy and by instituting a formal approval process with two-thirds of the FDIC Board, 
two-thirds of the Federal Reserve Board, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the President of the 
United States giving their backing.  Kane (2000) describes these large banks as being “too-big-
to-unwind” or “too-big-to-discipline-adequately (TBTDA),” suggesting that these banking 
organizations would be more likely to receive favorable treatment by both the market and 
regulators during a financial crisis.  
In addition, the TBTF notion has recently been extended beyond banking institutions to 
cover nonbank financial institutions as well. The rescue of Bear Stearns and AIG and the 
various new lending programs that currently allow nonbank institutions (such as primary 
dealers) to have access to the discount window mark a vast expansion of the government’s 
financial safety net (access to the Federal Reserve System’s discount window lending, federal 
government liability guarantee programs, and access to the payment system) beyond 
                                                                                                                                                             
facility (as of September 30, 2009). See the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (2009).   3
depository institutions.  More nonbanking institutions have come under the umbrella of TBTF 
banking institutions through the mergers supported by the federal government and bank 
regulators, for example, the regulator-assisted acquisitions of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America 
and Bear Stearns by JPMorganChase and Company (JPMC).  For the first time in the history of 
the Federal Reserve System, discount window access was extended to investment banks 
during the financial crisis that started in the mid-2007. The value of this extension is significant 
and is evident from the stock market’s reactions (see Panel B of Table 1).  The stock market 
reacted positively in response to the Federal Reserve’s extension of discount window access to 
investment banks.  We examine the abnormal stock return reactions of a portfolio of investment 
banking organizations (Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Goldman Sachs) 
and find positive and significant abnormal returns of 17.79 percent to these investment banks on 
March 14, 2009 when the Federal Reserve announced that it would lend to Bear Stearns 
through JPMC. This extension of the safety net beyond commercial banks to large investment 
banks (during the rescue of Bear Stearns) created value for other investment banking 
organizations in the same category as Bear Stearns and had no significant abnormal returns 
impact on TBTF commercial banks (either the largest 11 banks or those 16 banks with total 
assets’ book value greater than $100 billion).  According to Macey (2008), “[t]he bailout of Bear 
Stearns creates an unfair competitive environment in U.S. financial markets that is worse than 
the unfairness that led to FDICIA.  Not only are large firms being favored over small firms, but 
investment banks are getting for free a better government bailout than commercial banks 
receive only after paying insurance premiums to the FDIC.  The result will further weaken the 
U.S. banking industry and lead to a wave of mergers among investment banks seeking to 
become too-big-to-fail.” 
Alan Greenspan (2001), former chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, warned that policymakers must be "very cautious about purposefully or 
inadvertently extending the scope and reach” of the government’s financial safety net.  Similarly,   4
Charles I. Plosser (2008), president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, has also 
warned that “[p]olicy interventions in financial markets run the risks of increasing moral hazard 
and inhibiting efficient price discovery .... Interventions intended to quell instability can, by 
creating moral hazard, actually make instability more severe in the long run.” And furthermore, 
these policy interventions could have the unintended consequences of effectively subsidizing 
risk-taking by systemically important financial institutions. 
It should be pointed out that there is no such thing as a list of TBTF banks developed by 
U.S. banking supervisors or regulators.  Therefore, it is not always clear which institutions are 
TBTF and would be rescued in the event of crisis. This was evident recently when AIG and Bear 
Stearns received support while Lehman Brothers did not.
2  The general perception is that 
relatively larger institutions are more likely to be considered TBTF, although the specific TBTF 
threshold has never been officially defined. 
Since these TBTF benefits to banking organizations may translate to potential costs to 
taxpayers, there have also been concerns about how to limit these subsidies (e.g., controlling 
banking organizations’ size and making them smaller or focusing on managing the financial 
spillover better). The benefits of TBTF may be captured in a number of ways.  These include 
gaining favor with uninsured bank creditors and other market participants, operating with lower 
regulatory costs, and increasing the chances of receiving regulatory forbearance. Access to the 
federal government’s safety net allows TBTF institutions to operate with less capital and a lower 
funding cost relative to other institutions. To the extent that the public believes that the 
government would protect the TBTF banking organizations, their uninsured creditors do not 
charge as high a price for the use of their funds as they would in the absence of this perception.   
Several studies have examined the impacts of the TBTF policy, but it remains unclear 
how much value the TBTF and TBTDA aspects have added to bank shareholders’ wealth.   5
Through recent merger waves, banking organizations have become larger and more complex 
and increased their market shares and market power.  The perception is that these institutions 
may have become TBTF.  This paper focuses on estimating the potential value of the TBTF 
subsidy. In other words, we focus on estimating the potential costs to taxpayers as a result of 
the TBTF policy.  We generate estimates of the TBTF subsidy to large banking organizations, 
and we believe our estimates of the possible subsidies to these TBTF institutions could serve a 
useful purpose for future public policy discussions.    
If there is a significant value in achieving TBTF size, to capture expanded safety net 
access, banking organizations should be willing to pay more for those acquisitions that would 
enable them to reach such a size.  Moreover, if there are a limited number of suitable 
acquisitions that would allow an organization to become TBTF and if the organization has to 
outbid other organizations with similar motivations, the added acquisition premium could provide 
an indication of the overall magnitude of large bank subsidies.  This added premium could also 
imply that banking organizations see a strong benefit in reaching a threshold size large enough 
to become a key player in banking and to have control of their own fate ( e.g., through increases 
in market power and political clout).   
To test the hypothesis that banking organizations perceive benefits from reaching a 
TBTF threshold size, we use market pricing data and other financial information from the merger 
boom period, 1991-2004 (after FDICIA), during which a number of banking organizations greatly 
expanded their size by acquiring other organizations.  We find that banks have paid at least $14 
billion in added merger premiums for the eight merger deals during 1991-2004 that allowed the 
organizations to cross the perceived TBTF size threshold of $100 billion in assets.  In addition, 
we conduct an event study to examine how the stock returns of targets and acquiring banking 
organizations fare on or around the merger announcement that would enable the combined 
                                                                                                                                                             
2  At the end of November 2007, Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. had total assets with a book value of 
$691.1 billion, compared with $395.4 billion for Bear Stearns (about 55 percent of the size of Lehman   6
organization to become TBTF after the merger, and we find that the combined portfolio returns 
are positive and statistically significantly different from zero, suggesting that the market 
perceived the combination to be value enhancing.  Furthermore, our analysis of subordinated 
debt spreads before and after the mergers also indicates that the combined banking 
organizations face a lower funding cost after becoming TBTF through the merger. 
Section II provides a review of the relevant literature analyzing large bank subsidies. 
Section III develops an empirical model for measuring the potential TBTF subsidies.  Section IV 
discusses the empirical results, and Section V provides robustness tests of the results.  The 
estimated dollar value of the TBTF benefits, i.e., the potential cost to taxpayers, is presented in 
Section VI.  Finally, the conclusions and policy implications are discussed in Section VII. 
 
II. Literature Review -- Market Evidence on Potential Large Bank Subsidies 
  The scope and issue of TBTF have been influenced by a number of legislative and 
regulatory events.  These events have had an important role in determining the existence and 
potential size of large bank subsidies.  Among the most important of these have been the 
FDIC’s financial assistance to prevent the closure of Continental Illinois National Bank in 1984, 
the passage of FDICIA, the Federal Reserve’s intervention in resolving the capital shortage of 
Long Term Capital Management in 1998, and, most recently, the Federal Reserve’s intervention 
to rescue several large banking and nonbanking financial institutions and to extend access to 
the discount window to nonbanking financial institutions for the first time in Federal Reserve 
history. 
In 1984, the Comptroller of the Currency testified before the U.S. Congress on the 
bailout of Continental Illinois National Banks, implying that the banking agencies did not have 
the means to close any of the 11 largest multinational banks without the closure having a 
significant impact on the U.S. financial system. This testimony thus provided an official 
                                                                                                                                                             
Brothers).   7
acknowledgment of a TBTF policy, and it also indicated the type and size of banking 
organizations that might be considered TBTF. There have been concerns that regulatory 
agencies might have gone too far in protecting large banking organizations during the bank 
failures of the 1980s and 1990s, which led Congress to pass FDICIA in 1991. FDICIA sought to 
change how regulators could deal with failing banking organizations and, in particular, with 
TBTF banking organizations, but it obviously failed to eliminate the TBTF protection. Instead, it 
created a more formal and visible process for a TBTF bailout for some large U.S. banking 
organizations, as described earlier.  It was not evident until the 2007-2009 financial crisis that 
the TBTF policy continued to exist after passage of FDICIA; several research studies that have 
examined various aspects of TBTF are summarized below.   
Stock Market’s Reactions to Bank Mergers and TBTF   
Typically, the finance literature has established that the value of the target’s stock 
increases relative to the acquirer’s stock value on or around the merger announcement date.  
However, unlike in typical merger deals, Kane (2000) demonstrates that in a merger that 
involves very large banks (megabank mergers) stock of a megabank acquirer gains value at the 
announcement date.  These megamerger gains arise in part from improved access to monopoly 
rents and regulatory subsidies, including lower funding costs and increased market 
capitalization.
3   Kane (2000) examines banking megamergers during the period 1991-1998 
(after passage of FDICIA) and finds evidence of TBTF benefits even in the post-FDICIA period.  
The conclusion is that institutions engaging in megamergers hope to become so large or 
complex that they and their creditors will benefit from FDICIA’s systemic-risk exception, and that 
FDICIA may not be sufficient to minimize the TBTF merger incentives, especially since the 
banking industry has become much more complex and globally involved. 
                                                 
3    Megamerger is defined as a merger involving one of the 12 largest banks that increases the size of 
the merged organization by at least half the amount of assets or market capitalization As of 1998, these 
banks were Chase Manhattan, Citicorp, Nations, J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, First Union, Bankers 
Trust, Banc One, First Chicago NBD, Fleet, Wells Fargo, and Norwest.   8
In addition, Schmid and Walter (2006) examine the value of financial conglomerates and 
whether bigger and/or broader (through economies of scope) is better.  They find that, overall, 
the negative elements present in financial conglomerates outweigh the positive elements, so 
that financial conglomerates generally trade at a discount relative to specialized financial firms. 
However, they find no conglomerate discount but a significant positive premium for firms  whose 
total assets’ book value is larger than $100 billion.  They conclude that the TBTF perception 
exists.  
Bond Market’s Reactions to Bank Mergers and TBTF   
Penas and Unal (2004) examine changes in adjusted bond returns at acquiring and 
target banking organizations in response to their merger announcements during the period 
1991-1998.  They also compare credit spreads (difference between the bond yield at issue and 
the yield on comparable U.S. Treasury securities) on bonds issued before and after the merger.  
They find little change in either bond returns or credit spreads when the acquiring banks are 
either small or already TBTF (with assets of at least 2 percent of the banking industry).
4  
However, when banks in these size ranges acquire another bank, Penas and Unal  find that 
credit spreads decline significantly after the merger.  They attribute this result to the benefits 
banks derive from reaching or getting closer to the TBTF status and from attaining a higher 
degree of diversification.  These results thus provide evidence that bondholders attach a value 
to banks becoming TBTF through mergers. 
The Continental Illinois Evidence of TBTF    
Using an event study methodology, O’Hara and Shaw (1990) investigate the effects of 
the Comptroller of the Currency’s 1984 announcement that some banking organizations were 
TBTF.  They find that banking organizations deemed to be TBTF experienced a statistically 
significant positive average abnormal return of 1.3 percent on the day the Comptroller’s 
                                                 
4   Note that the asset size of 2 percent of the banking industry ranges widely during the sample period, 
from $77 billion in 1991 to $142 billion in 1998.       9
announcement was made, with the highest returns going to the riskiest and very largest 
organizations.  In contrast, banking organizations not regarded as TBTF had median returns of  
-0.22 percent that day, and the banking organizations that were hurt the most were those just 
under the TBTF cutoff.  These results thus suggest that becoming TBTF is valued by market 
participants and carries a wealth effect reflective of this perceived favorable treatment. 
In addition, Morgan and Stiroh (2005) find that the naming of the TBTF banking 
organizations by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in 1984 elevated the bond 
ratings of those banking organizations (bank holding companies) about one notch compared to 
non-TBTF organizations, with subordinated note investors showing even more optimism than 
the rating agencies about future support for TBTF banking organizations. Morgan and Stiroh 
further discover that this spread and rating relation continues in the 1990s, suggesting that 
FDICIA had little effect on how debtholders perceived the possibility of support for TBTF 
banking organizations.
5   
Other Related Studies    
Brickley and James (1986) analyze how access to deposit insurance affects the 
common stock returns of financial institutions during a period of financial distress, using savings 
and loan association (S&L) data from 1976 to 1983 (the pre-FDICIA period). They find that stock 
returns for financially distressed S&Ls were less sensitive to market movements than other 
S&Ls. In fact, weaker S&Ls responded to modifications in the now-defunct Federal Saving and 
Loan Insurance Corporation closure policy as if deposit insurance were a valuable subsidy. 
Rime (2005) examines the effect of TBTF on credit ratings, using a sample of large and 
small banks ($1 billion to $1.1 trillion) in 21 industrialized countries during the period 1999-2003.  
                                                 
5 The rating agencies have acknowledged that they consider a bank’s TBTF status when issuing their 
ratings.  According to Moody’s, “Institutional support, that is, the likelihood that in case of need banks will 
get help from the public sector (central governments, regional governments, etc.), is a factor taken into 
account in the analytical mix underpinning banks’ debt and deposit ratings… it is very likely that 
governments in developed markets, having both the capacity and the willingness to act, will continue to   10
Moody’s and Fitch assign two types of ratings to banks: with and without consideration of other 
external factors (including a possible external or federal support) that would influence the bank’s 
capacity to repay its debt. Rime finds that the TBTF status of a bank (proxied by size and 
market share) has a significant, positive impact on the bank’s credit rating, controlling for all the 
other external factors, such as explicit state guarantees.  The largest banks in the sample get a 
rating “bonus” of several notches for being TBTF. 
While several recent studies have found evidence of TBTF even after FDICIA, a few 
studies found no evidence of TBTF.  For example, Angbazo and Saunders (1997) find that the 
systematic risk estimate for large banking organizations declined after FDICIA was passed, 
presumably, in part, because of the new incentives FDICIA gave uninsured depositors to 
monitor banks more closely.  Flannery and Sorescu (1996) examine market discipline in the 
subordinated debt market for banking organizations in the pre- and post-FDICIA period and find 
some evidence of stronger market discipline (thus, little or no TBTF effect) in the post-FDICIA 
period. In addition, Ennis and Malek (2005) revisited the negative empirical relation between 
performance and asset size, which Boyd and Gertler (1994) document as the TBTF subsidy 
effect based on data in the 1984-1991 (pre-FDICIA) period.  Ennis and Malek find no conclusive 
evidence of different TBTF performance for large (more than $10 billion) vs. small banks, based 
on data in the 1992-2003 (post-FDICIA) period.  Also, Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995) 
examine the prices that acquirers were willing to bid to acquire target banks during the period 
1980-1989 and find little evidence of a motive to enhance the TBTF subsidy.  They conclude 
that most of mergers in the 1980s were motivated by earnings diversification rather than an 
attempt to exploit the FDIC insurance subsidy.   
Our Objectives and Findings   
                                                                                                                                                             
offer support to the country’s largest financial institutions.”  See Moody’s Investors Service: Global Credit 
Research, Rating Methodology (An Analytical Framework for Banks in Developed Markets), April 1999.    11
While the TBTF evidence so far has been inconclusive based on the banking literature 
(depending on the data, time period, and research methodology), the cost of TBTF distortions 
could be large.
6 The objective of our paper is to shed some light on the perceived TBTF 
threshold size and the magnitude of the TBTF subsidy.  Following the basic model used in 
Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995), we re-specify the model to incorporate the variables 
designed to capture TBTF subsidies.  In other words, we include additional variables that would 
separate out the TBTF effects that may have been embedded in other factors in their model, 
such as the market to book value variables.  Interestingly, we find evidence consistent with our 
TBTF subsidy hypothesis, even when using more recent data in the post-FDICIA period.   
 
III. The Data and Research Framework 
Our analysis looks at the purchase premiums (offer price at an announcement date 
minus market price prior to the announcement date) that acquiring banking organizations are 
willing to offer to buy a target organization and whether these premiums are higher when an 
acquisition enables an organization to reach a size that is perceived by the market as being 
TBTF.  The analysis uses merger transactions among publicly traded banking organizations 
during the period 1991-2004 (post-FDICIA).  These mergers and acquisitions, along with 
information about each transaction, are obtained from the Security Data Corporation (SDC).  To 
be included in this study, both the acquiring and target banks must be publicly traded.  In all, the 
data set encompasses 411 merger transactions.  Stock market information is obtained from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, and financial data are obtained from 
bank holding company Y-9 reports, call reports, and thrift financial reports for the 13 quarters 
prior to the merger announcement date. 
                                                 
6  See Stern (2009a, 2009b), Stern and Feldman (2004, 2009) and Mishkin (2006) for the various policy 
measures currently being discussed for reducing potential distortions induced by TBTF.   12
The basic framework of this study is adapted from that of Benston, Hunter and Wall 
(1995), which examines bank mergers in the 1980s.  They have two competing hypotheses: 
purchase premiums in bank mergers are driven by earnings diversification (risk-reducing 
strategy) vs. maximization of the value of the deposit insurance put option (risk-increasing 
strategy). Our model relates the purchase premiums that acquiring organizations pay to whether 
the merged organizations will become large enough to reach TBTF status. This is in addition to 
the various risk factors included in Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995).  To the extent that 
investors place a value on TBTF banks, purchase premiums should be larger when the 
acquisition will help create a TBTF banking organization, provided adjustments are made for 
other relevant factors.
7  Conversely, purchase premiums would be expected to be smaller when 
the merged organizations are too small to become TBTF.  Thus, our model will relate purchase 
premiums to the different merger scenarios regarding the TBTF status of the merging 
organizations while controlling for other characteristics of the acquiring and target banking 
organizations and for other possible merger motivations as in the following expression: 
Purchase Premium = f(TBTF status, Characteristics of the Target, Characteristics of the  
    Acquirer, Characteristics of the Merger Deal, Other Control Factors)    (1) 
 
Purchase Premiums. Following Benston, Hunter, and Wall’s (1995) model, the purchase 
premiums (in $ million) are computed as purchase price less pre-consolidation market value.  
Specifically, purchase premiums are calculated by taking the difference between the announced 
offer price for a target organization and the market price of the target’s common stock before the 
merger announcement. The purchase premium thus captures the dollar markup over a target’s 
pre-acquisition stock price that the acquiring organization must pay to acquire control of the 
target. The target’s market price is obtained for three different dates: 20, 40, and 60 business 
                                                 
7 This assumes that there are a limited number of appropriate targets and that other acquiring banks are 
also interested in these targets as a means of becoming TBTF.               13
days prior to the merger announcement date.  These three different dates are used as a means 
of capturing the most current market valuation of the target while acknowledging that many 
mergers may be anticipated or become known to investors before the announcement date.
8   
Merger Scenarios.  Bank mergers in the data set can be divided into four categories, 
with the fourth category (both the acquirer and the target too small to create a TBTF bank 
through merging) serving as the base case to which we compare the other merger possibilities.  
These categories are: 
Category 1: Both the acquiring banking organization and the target banking organization 
are not TBTF in the pre-merger period, but after the merger, their combined assets will reach or 
exceed the TBTF size threshold. In this case, the hypothesis would be that the acquiring 
organization would be willing to pay a higher purchase premium, given the potential benefits 
that would accrue to becoming TBTF to capture enhanced access to the federal government’s 
safety net.
9  We construct an indicator variable (DBECOMETBTF) to capture this hypothesized 
relation, and this variable takes on a value of one for each merger that creates a new TBTF 
organization and zero for all other mergers. A positive coefficient would be expected for 
DBECOMETBTF if the acquiring banking organizations are willing to pay more relative to those 
mergers that do not result in TBTF organizations to capture the benefits of TBTF.   
Category 2: The acquiring banking organization is already TBTF before the merger takes 
place, while the target banking organization is not TBTF.  In this case, the acquiring banking 
organization has previously captured the benefits of being TBTF, and the merger would not add 
the same value to the acquirer as in Case 1.  In some cases, the target banking organization’s 
stockholders and management might even be willing to accept somewhat lower premiums 
                                                 
8 See Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001) and DeLong and DeYoung (2007) for information about 
market anticipation of bank mergers. 
9 The shareholders of the target organization could also experience a gain from becoming TBTF if they 
become part of the new organization. However, we hypothesize that these stockholders are fully aware of 
their value to the acquirer and other organizations nearing TBTF status and know that their stock can 
command a higher premium.   14
compared to other merger possibilities, particularly if they will be continuing their role in the 
merged organization and will receive long-run benefits from being part of a TBTF organization.  
We use the indicator variable, DACQUIRERTBTF, to represent this case. This variable takes on 
the value of one when the acquirer is TBTF, but the target is not, and zero otherwise.  When 
compared to the base case, this variable would be expected to have a coefficient that is near 0 
or possibly negative (as the target may be willing to accept a smaller premium or a discount in 
order to become part of a TBTF organization after the merger).  In addition, we also construct 
another variable, DACQUIRERTBTF * TAt, which is a cross product of the indicator variable 
DACQUIRERTBTF and the target’s asset size (TAt).  Since the acquirer, although already TBTF 
prior to the merger, would further benefit from the potential TBTF subsidy as its deposit base 
expands, the acquirer may be willing to pay more for the target with a larger deposit or asset 
base.  Thus, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive. 
Category 3: This category is for megamergers where both the acquirer and the target 
are already TBTF before they merge.  Consequently, neither organization is likely to capture 
significant additional regulatory benefits. Thus, the coefficient of this indicator variable would be 
expected to be near zero.  This variable, DBOTHTBTF, is defined as taking on the value of one 
when both the acquirer and the target are already TBTF prior to the merger, and zero otherwise.  
In this case, while the acquirers are already TBTF, there may still be an incentive to further 
maximize the value of the deposit insurance put option by acquiring a TBTF target whose 
returns are highly correlated with theirs. This impact on the purchase premium is captured by an 
interactive variable DBOTHTBTF * COVt,a, which is a product of DBOTHTBTF and the covariance of 
the return on assets of the target and acquirer over the 13 quarters before the quarter of the 
merger announcement date (COVt,a).  In addition, the TBTF acquirer may also be willing to pay 
a larger purchase premium to acquire a TBTF target with a larger deposit base.  This impact is 
captured by a variable DBOTHTBTF* TAt, which is a cross product of the indicator variable 
DBOTHTBTF and the target’s asset size.   15
Category 4: Mergers assigned to this category are those in which the acquirer and the 
target are too small to create a TBTF banking organization after their merger, and this case 
provides the base case or the omitted variable to which the other merger categories will be 
compared. 
Definition of TBTF. Before we can assign values to the indicator variables described 
above, we must specify a definition of the size threshold for TBTF status.  Selecting this TBTF 
size threshold is a conceptual matter.  As mentioned earlier, TBTF is not officially specified 
anywhere by law or regulatory policy but instead depends on the judgments of regulators about 
which banking organizations would be a threat to the financial stability of the economy if they 
were to encounter problems and “failed.”  An initial guide to defining TBTF comes from the 
announcement following the Continental Illinois crisis in 1984, when the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) implied that 11 large multinational banking organizations 
were TBTF.
10  Since then, a number of these organizations have disappeared through mergers 
with other TBTF firms, thus leaving a smaller population of the “original” TBTF banking 
organizations.  However, with rapid banking consolidation, a significant number of other banking 
organizations have reached fairly high size thresholds, and a number of these banking 
organizations might now be judged as TBTF by market participants.  Since TBTF is not officially 
defined, there is no way to know with certainty what size of banking organization might be 
regarded by regulators as being TBTF.  However, the market (including investors and uninsured 
depositors) form their own perceptions, and these perceptions are reflected in the prices of 
securities issued by the banking organizations. 
Interestingly, O’Hara and Shaw (1990) find that the group of banking organizations they 
used to examine the market’s reaction to the OCC’s announcement in 1984 was that suggested 
by the Wall Street Journal, and NOT the actual list of firms specified by the OCC.  O’Hara and   16
Shaw (1990) thus demonstrate that market perceptions of TBTF will influence firm values, even 
when those perceptions may in fact be different from that of the regulators. It is important to 
point this out, since no one really knows what the correct threshold size is for banks to become 
TBTF.   
One of our objectives is to estimate a perceived TBTF threshold size based on the 
observed behavior of market participants during bank mergers of 1991-2004.  In this study, we 
examine three different TBTF size thresholds: (1) banks  whose total assets’ book value  $100 
billion; (2) banks that are one of the 11 largest organizations in each year; and (3) banks with 
market value of equity  $20 billion.  We find that $100 billion in total assets, $20 billion in 
market capitalization, and being one of the largest 11 banks in the United States have been 
perceived by the market as important criteria for becoming TBTF.
11  In addition, we find that 
market participants seem to believe that the TBTF subsidy would gradually increase further as 
TBTF banking organizations continue to expand their asset base. Note that the threshold of 
$100 billion book value of total assets used in this paper also provides a good dividing line for 
separating organizations with a national scope from regional organizations.  Overall, we find that 
banking organizations seem to be willing to pay extra premiums in order to reach these TBTF 
thresholds.   
Control Variables. Acquisition purchase premiums could be influenced by a variety of 
factors other than whether the combined organization will become TBTF.  The starting point for 
measuring the value of the target both as a stand-alone firm and in an acquisition is its current 
market value and underlying riskiness as capture by the variability of profitability.  These are 
then augmented with measures of the market value and underlying riskiness of the acquirer.  
                                                                                                                                                             
10  Even the OCC’s statement led to confusion in the market, since some took this to mean just the 11 
largest national banks, while others thought it meant the 11 largest banks in the country (with either state 
or national charters). 
11   Other TBTF definitions we have examined include total assets’ book value of $150 billion and $200 
billion and market capitalization thresholds from $15 billion to $30 billion, both unadjusted and adjusted   17
Further, the covariability of the acquirer’s and target’s earnings is included to proxy for the 
extent to which the acquisition would increase or reduce the variability of the acquirer’s 
earnings.  Three variables representing the variance and covariance of the acquirers’ and 
targets’ return on assets are included as proxies, as in Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995). The 
variances of return on assets for the target and acquirer over the 13 quarters prior to the merger 
announcement date are represented by VROAt and VROAa, respectively.  The covariance of the 
returns on their assets is represented by COVt,a.   
The post-merger value of the combined firms also depends on the difficulty of merging 
the firms and the potential for cost savings.  The measure of the potential scale economies and 
the relative difficulty of absorbing the target into the acquirer are given by the variable Relative.  
Relative measures the relative size of the two banks’ total assets, allowing for other size-related 
non-TBTF benefits to be controlled for in the regression equation.   
Regional Impact.  Following Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995), we include the regional 
indicator variables (East, West, and Southeast, with the Midwest providing the base for 
comparison or the omitted indicator variable) to capture in which part of the U.S. a target was 
headquartered.  Targets located in faster growing regions of the country or those headquartered 
in key financial centers or regions would be expected to command higher purchase premiums.  
In addition, the combined target assets in the region controls for the demand pressure in the 
specific region. 
Another consideration in an acquisition is whether it is intra-state or inter-state. While 
inter-state acquisitions provide a chance to enter new markets and to achieve greater 
geographic diversification, in-state deals may increase market power and allow greater cost 
savings through the consolidation of operations and closing of duplicate offices.  To test for 
these possible effects, we define an indicator variable (Instate) that takes on the value of one if 
                                                                                                                                                             
for inflation.  As would be expected, a handful of organizations shift between the various merger 
categories, depending on which TBTF size threshold is used.     18
the target and the acquirer have their headquarters in the same state and zero if they do not. 
Bank mergers are more likely to generate cost savings when the two banks’ existing markets 
overlap. Following Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995), we also include the market-to-book value 
ratio of the target (MVBVt) as a measure of how investors view the target’s prospects; the 
market-to-book value ratio of the acquirer (MVBVa) to capture how investors view the acquirer’s 
prospects; and the book value capital-to-total asset (leverage) ratio, CRATIOa, to further capture 
the risk of the acquirer.   
This paper expands Benston, Hunter, and Wall’s (1995) specification to include several 
additional variables. A possible important determinant of the value of the target is its likely 
growth rate after the merger.  A proxy for the expected growth in the target’s market is GTAt and 
a proxy for the influence of the acquirer on the growth rate is GTAa.  Both measures are 
calculated as the growth in the respective firm’s total assets over the 13 quarters prior to the 
merger announcement. The target’s stock market beta coefficient, BETAt, is included to capture 
its systematic risk in the past year (i.e. 300 business days).  A negative coefficient would be 
expected to reflect smaller premiums for higher risk targets.  The systematic risk measure of the 
acquirer, BETAa, is also included in the analysis.   
In addition, we include an indicator variable that flags the mergers of equal deals, MOE, 
to capture the impact on the purchase premiums when the target and the acquirers are similar 
in terms of asset size.  In a merger of equals, the target and acquirer tend to have similar 
bargaining powers and would likely be willing to exchange shares roughly in relation to their 
current market prices. The offer price compared with the prior market value would likely be 
much smaller than other types of acquisitions; thus a negative coefficient for this variable would 
be expected.  
Finally, year fixed effects (D1991 - D2003, with 2004 serving as the base for comparison 
or the omitted variable) are added to the equation.  Our purchase premium could depend in part 
on whether the mergers are announced at the beginning or end of a merger wave. The inclusion   19
of annual fixed effects provides a control for merger wave dynamics as well as any other effects 
due to the timing of the announcements.  
Panel A of Table 2 presents the definition and provides the summary statistics for each 
of the explanatory variables, based on all 411 bank mergers that were announced during 1991-
2004.  Panel B of Table 2 presents summary statistics for important variables’ breakdown by 
TBTF category.  Average merger premiums are largest for those mergers that created a TBTF 
banking organization (Case 1) and then for those mergers between TBTF acquirer and TBTF 
target (Case 3).  The average merger premiums for the other two categories, TBTF acquirer and 
non-TBTF target (Case 2) and the base case of non-TBTF (Case 4), are much smaller at about 
one-third of the average premiums for Cases 1 and 3.  In terms of risk as measured by volatility 
of returns and systematic risk exposure, it is interesting to note that targets in Case 1 (Become 
TBTF) are most risky on average, with the highest return volatility and the highest exposures to 
systematic risk compared to other cases.   
The empirical specification, including the indicator variables that capture the TBTF status 
of each merger deal, takes the following form: 
PREM (20, 40, 60) = a + b1 (VROAt) (TAt) +   b2 (MVBVt) (TAt)  
+ b3 (BETAt) (TAt) +   b4 (GTAt) (TAt) + b5 (VROAa) (TAt)+   b6 (MVBVa) (TAt)  
+ b7 (BETAa) (TAt) +   b8 (GTAa) (TAt) + b9 (CRATIOa) (TAt) 
+ b10 (COVt,a) (TAt) +   b11 (Relative) (TAt) + b12 (Instate) +   b13 (MOE) 
 + b14 (East) +   b15 (West) +   b16 (Southeast) + b17 (D1990) 
 + b18 (D1991) + …+ b30 (D2003) 
 + b31 (DBECOMETBTF) +   b32 (DACQUIRERTBTF)  
+ b33 (DACQUIRERTBTF * TAt) +   b34 (DBOTHTBTF)  
+ b35 (DBOTHTBTF * TAt) + b36 (DBOTHTBTF * COVt,a) + ε     (2) 
   20
IV. The Empirical Results 
Our analysis finds that the significance of the coefficients is very similar regardless of the 
length of window (20-day, 40-day, and 60-day) used in calculating the purchase premium.  The 
20-day window is likely to provide the most conservative measure of the TBTF subsidy because 
this shorter window is less likely to be affected by other (unrelated) events that occurred prior to 
the 20-day window and because the impact of the premium may be underestimated due to the 
market’s anticipation of the merger, driving the target’s share price up. Thus, if significance is 
found, using the 20-day window would likely underestimate the true impact. To conserve space, 
we report regression results only for the 20-day window, but our calculation of the total dollar 
subsidy is presented for all three windows.
12   
Table 3 presents the results of our regression analysis based on the most conservative 
20-day window and three different TBTF definitions. All of the analysis includes the same 411 
merger deals in the sample period of 1991 to 2004 (post-FDICIA period).  Column 1 presents 
the results when using a size threshold of $100 billion book value of total assets for an 
organization to reach TBTF status.  Columns 2 and 3 present the results when using alternative 
threshold sizes, asset size of the 11
th largest banking organizations in each year and the $20 
billion market capitalization thresholds, respectively. The year indicator variables (D1991… 
D2003) are included in all columns of the table but the coefficient estimates are not reported 
here.   
Because the same banking organization may be involved in multiple merger 
transactions, the error term may be correlated across observations. According to Petersen 
(2009), the Rogers procedure would produce more correct standard errors than White (1980) in 
the presence of a firm effect.  We use the Rogers procedure to correct the standard errors in our 
regression analysis, where the panel estimation technique used to obtain the coefficients 
corrects the standard errors of the coefficient estimates using the Rogers procedure (see   21
Rogers, 1993 and Williams, 2000).  The Rogers corrected standard errors may be viewed as 
those of White (1980) standard errors adjusted to account for possible correlation within a 
cluster, and the t-statistics reported in parentheses in Table 3 are based on these standard 
errors.   
The results are generally consistent across all the TBTF thresholds, since most of the 
banking organizations are repeated across these three TBTF definitions.  Overall, the results for 
the various TBTF variables support the hypothesis that acquiring banks are willing to pay a 
higher price for merger deals that would take them over the TBTF thresholds.   
 
Did Banks Pay Significant Additional Premiums to Become TBTF?  
Category 1: Becoming TBTF.  From Table 3, the coefficients of DBECOMETBTF are 
consistently positive and significant.  The results strongly indicate that these organizations are 
willing to pay higher premiums for acquisitions that enable them to reach the TBTF threshold 
and to gain increased access to the federal safety net, controlling for other factors that are 
generally expected to affect the purchase premiums.   
Category 2:  Acquirers Already TBTF, Target Becoming TBTF.  The coefficients of 
DACQUIRERTBTF are consistently negative but mostly insignificant, as expected.  Some of the 
non-TBTF targets seem to be willing to accept purchase premiums below those on other types 
of transactions just for the opportunity to become part of a TBTF organization.  However, the 
coefficients of the cross product term DACQUIRERTBTF * TAt are consistently positive and 
mostly significant.  This provides some indication that while the organizations that are already 
TBTF are not paying as much for their acquisitions compared to other banking organizations 
that are striving to reach that level, the TBTF acquiring banks are willing to pay increasing 
premiums according to the target’s asset size. Larger targets allow TBTF acquirers greater 
opportunity to expand their deposit base and to increase the TBTF subsidy, thus receiving 
                                                                                                                                                             
12  The 40-day and 60-day window results are available from the authors upon request.   22
larger purchase premiums.  The net change in purchase premiums in this case depends on the 
combined effects of both coefficients.   
Category 3:  Both Acquirers and Targets Already TBTF.  The coefficients of the stand-
alone indicator variable DBOTHTBTF are insignificant.  In addition, when taking into consideration 
the target’s asset size, the coefficients of the cross product term DBOTHTBTF * TAt are also 
consistently insignificant.  These results suggest that TBTF acquirers have no incentive to pay 
excess premiums to acquire another TBTF banking organization in order to expand their asset 
base.  From our examination of the TBTF banks’ potential motivation to increase portfolio risk 
(to maximize the value of the deposit insurance put option), we find that the coefficients of the 
cross product term DBOTHTBTF * COVt,a are consistently negative and significant, indicating that 
the purchase premiums are significantly smaller when a TBTF acquirer merges with a TBTF 
target whose returns are highly correlated with that of the acquirer.  These results suggest that 
TBTF acquirers do not look to increase their portfolio risk by merging with another TBTF 
banking organization. In fact, TBTF acquirers would be willing to pay higher purchase premiums 
to acquire a TBTF target whose returns are less correlated with their own returns and, therefore, 
would help improve the portfolio diversification of the combined banking organization.   
 
Importance of Other Characteristics 
Target’s Characteristics.  From Table 3, the coefficients of BETAt are consistently 
negative and significant, suggesting that acquirers might pay smaller premiums (or possibly 
discounts) when acquiring a systematically risky target, whose returns are subject to greater 
volatility (nondiversifiable risk) than the overall market portfolio.  However, we find that the 
coefficients of VROAt are consistently positive but insignificant, indicating that, overall, the 
target’s idiosyncratic risk does not matter as much as the systematic risk in affecting the 
purchase premiums.     23
Although the cross product term of the covariance and the TBTF variable (DBOTHTBTF * 
COVt,a) was significantly negative (discussed earlier), the coefficients of COVt,a are mixed and 
mostly insignificant. While the correlation between the target’s returns and the acquirer’s returns 
is mostly unimportant for non-TBTF banking organizations, it is relatively important for TBTF 
banks.  Overall, our results suggest that portfolio diversification is generally not the primary 
motive for bank mergers, with an exception for mergers between TBTF banking organizations in 
which the opportunity to further diversify the portfolio seems to command an increased 
purchase premium that the acquirers would be willing to pay.   
Our findings are different from those in Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995), in which both 
the target’s return volatility and the covariance of returns between targets and acquirers were 
significantly negative, suggesting that acquirers would pay larger merger premiums when there 
are opportunities for portfolio diversification.  Their results may be driven by their model 
assumptions in which all bank mergers are treated in the same way (regardless of whether the 
banks are TBTF) and their lack of distinction for diversifiable vs. nondiversifiable risks.  We take 
a more refined approach to improve on their model by (1) separating mergers that involve TBTF 
from those that do not and (2) separating out the systematic risk (nondiversifiable risk) from the 
overall return volatility.  Our results show that the motive for mergers is not always the same 
across all merger transactions.  Portfolio diversification is important only to those mergers 
between banking organizations that were already TBTF.  In addition, we find that becoming part 
of a TBTF banking organization is one of the important factors in the mergers that involve non-
TBTF banking organizations. 
For other characteristics of the target, the coefficients of MVBVt are mostly insignificant, 
suggesting that targets with higher market-to-book value ratios are not perceived by the market 
to have a greater potential for earnings growth and/or be more efficient than the other targets.  
Note that this variable is also insignificant in Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995).  Finally, the 
coefficients of GTAt are consistently negative and mostly significant, suggesting that fast-  24
growing targets (with high asset growth over the past 13 quarters) were not able to command a 
larger purchase premium.  To summarize, our results indicate that while the target’s current 
asset size (in conjunction with whether the acquirer is already TBTF) may be an important factor 
in bank mergers, how fast the target was growing prior to the merger made little difference in the 
purchase premiums, and, in fact, faster growing targets might receive a smaller purchase 
premium holding everything else fixed. 
Acquirer Characteristics.  From Table 3, the coefficients of VROAa are consistently 
negative and significant, suggesting that less risky acquirers (likely with better risk control and 
management) are more likely to offer larger merger purchase premiums, controlling for the 
characteristics of the targets and the merger deals.   In addition, the coefficients of MVBVa are 
consistently positive and significant, in line with the view that more efficient acquirers are willing 
to pay more (as their share prices are also highly priced) in the stock market.  Our results on 
these two characteristics of acquirers are the same as those in Benston, Hunter, and Wall 
(1995), and they are consistent with an argument that acquirers with higher quality management 
(as reflected in a larger MVBVa) can benefit more from mergers and acquisitions.  These 
acquirer-related results are also consistent with our earlier findings that the target’s return 
volatility (poor quality of risk management) is unimportant in determining the purchase premium.   
The coefficients of GTAa are consistently negative but insignificant.  The coefficients of 
BETAa are mixed and mostly insignificant.  These results suggest that there is no strong relation 
between the purchase premium that the acquirer is willing to offer and the acquirer’s systematic 
risk or the acquirer’s asset growth (over the 13 quarters prior to the merger announcement 
date).  The coefficients of CRATIOa are consistently positive and mostly significant, suggesting 
that well-capitalized banks may be willing to pay larger purchase premiums, and this is 
consistent with the findings in Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995).  Overall, we find that the 
amount of premiums that acquirers are willing to pay is determined by several factors, including 
the acquirer’s capital ratio (or leverage ratio), whether the acquirer is already TBTF, and   25
whether the merger would allow the organization to cross the perceived TBTF threshold.  In 
addition, the covariance of returns between the target and the acquirer (for mergers between 
TBTF banking organizations), the target’s systematic risk (risk that cannot be diversified away), 
and the efficiency of the acquirer (as measured by the acquirer’s overall risk, volatility of returns, 
and the market-to-book ratio) also play a role in determining the merger premiums.   
Finally, we find that the coefficients of Relative are positive and significant, suggesting 
that the acquirers are willing to pay more to acquire targets of greater relative size, since such 
targets might provide greater opportunities for merger-related efficiencies.   This is opposite to 
Benston, Hunter, and Wall (1995), who argue that relatively larger targets offer fewer 
opportunities for new product introduction and, thus, receive smaller purchase premiums.   
Again, the difference here may be driven by factors related to TBTF or systematic risk vs. 
overall volatility, as these variables that are measured separately in their model.  Our finding of 
larger purchase premiums related to targets of greater relative size is consistent with our earlier 
argument that larger targets provide greater opportunity for TBTF banking organizations to 
expand their subsidy through a larger asset and deposit base. 
To summarize, more efficient acquirers that are able to manage the risk well and/or 
operate more efficiently  would be willing to pay larger purchase premiums, controlling for TBTF 
factors.  In addition, targets with smaller systematic risks tend to receive larger premiums, and 
targets with larger relative size could command larger purchase premiums.  Most important, we 
find that becoming TBTF and increasing the TBTF subsidy significantly affect the purchase 
premiums that the acquiring banking organizations are willing to offer. 
  Deal Characteristics.  We find that the regional variables are not significant after 
controlling for other characteristics of the targets and the acquirers.  The coefficients for Instate 
are consistently negative but sometimes insignificant, suggesting that there is little or no cost 
efficiency benefit in same state mergers. Interstate mergers may tend to provide more 
opportunity for the acquirers to expand their out-of-state client base.  Finally, we find that the   26
coefficients for MOE are consistently statistically significantly negative, suggesting that 
purchase premiums may be smaller for mergers of equal deals.  This finding is consistent with 
Brewer, Jackson, Jagtiani, and Nguyen (2000) and Brewer, Jackson, and Jagtiani (2005) in that 
any mergers involving two banking organizations of equal size are more likely to face problems 
in melding their cultures after the merger.   
 
V.  Robustness Test 
We have conducted additional analysis, using stock market and bond market data, to 
further support our results related to the TBTF subsidies.  In this section, we examine whether 
the markets view each merger positively or negatively based on the TBTF category of the 
mergers.  Our overall results based on cumulative abnormal stock market returns around the 
merger and changes in the acquirer’s funding cost (due to merger) in the bond market are 
consistent with our earlier findings.  That is, there are significant benefits associated with being 
TBTF or being systemically important banking organizations. 
 
Stock Market Reactions 
This section investigates the stock market’s reactions to mergers that involved TBTF 
and/or non-TBTF banking organizations classified by cases 1, 2, 3, and 4 as described earlier.  
Using stock market returns around the merger announcement date, we examine the cumulative 
abnormal returns to the targets, the acquirers, and the combined banking organization.  This 
provides further understanding of the overall impact of TBTF  and how the increased TBTF 
subsidies are divided between the target and the acquirer. 
We estimate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over several event windows for 
targets, acquirers, and portfolios of targets and acquirers around the merger announcement 
date over the period 1991-2004.  We examine the CARs separately for each of the TBTF 
categories (using the threshold of $100 billion book value of total assets): (1) when both the   27
target and the acquirer become TBTF after the merger; (2) when the acquirer is already TBTF 
prior to the merger but the target is not; and (3) when both the target and the acquirer are 
already TBTF prior to the merger.  Using  standard event study methodology, we compute 
abnormal returns (ARi,t) for bank i for the event day t.
13  The abnormal returns are calculated for 
each of the targets and for each of the acquirers.  We then calculate the overall abnormal 
returns around the merger announcement date for the combined banking organization (referred 
to as portfolio abnormal returns), based on the abnormal returns of the target and the acquiring 
banks.  Following Houston and Ryngaert (1994), we define the abnormal portfolio return for 
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where the variable MVT,-20 is the market value of the target 20 days before the merger 
announcement date, and the variable MVA,-20 is the market value of the acquiring bank 20 days 
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where the variable A,T, is the estimated correlation coefficient between acquirer and target 
market model residuals obtained over the estimation period, the variable 
i A n is the number of 
                                                 
13 See Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) for a detail discussion of this methodology.   28
days in the acquirer’s abnormal return window, and the variable 
i T n is the number of days in the 
target’s abnormal return window.  The results are presented in Table 4. 
  Case 1: For mergers between non-TBTF targets and non-TBTF acquirers in which the 
combined banking organization will become TBTF, we find that the average abnormal return to 
the target for this group of mergers is positive and significant (15.54 percent abnormal returns), 
while the average abnormal returns to the acquirer are not significantly different from zero.  This 
result is consistent with our earlier findings that acquirers are willing to pay a higher purchase 
premium in mergers that would allow the combined banking organization to become TBTF.  In 
addition, we find that average abnormal returns to the combined banking organization are 
positive and significant (6 percent abnormal returns), consistent with the argument that these 
mergers were perceived by the market to be value-added, since they allow the banking 
organizations increased access to the federal safety net after the merger. 
  Case 2:  For mergers between TBTF acquirers and non-TBTF targets, we find the 
average abnormal return to the target to be positive and significant (close to 12 percent 
abnormal returns), indicating that becoming part of a TBTF banking organization through the 
merger has added value to the target.  The average abnormal returns to the TBTF acquirer are 
slightly negative and significant.  As expected, the average abnormal returns to the combined 
organization are not significantly different from zero.  Again, this is consistent with our TBTF 
hypothesis, as the market does not perceive the mergers in this category to provide further 
benefits or subsidies to the combined banking organization. 
  Case 3:  For mergers between TBTF targets and TBTF acquirers, we find positive and 
significant average abnormal returns to the target (10 percent abnormal returns) and 
insignificant or small negative abnormal returns to the acquirer.  The average abnormal returns 
to the combined banking firm are slightly positive and significant, suggesting that the market 
perceived the mergers of two TBTF banking organizations to add some additional subsidy   29
values (increased access to the federal safety net), since the combined banking organization 
becomes too interconnected and important to the overall economy and the payment systems.  
Through these mergers, these already TBTF banking organizations were likely to have moved 
themselves up on the TBTF list, since the asset base and network of the combined TBTF 
organization have further expanded throughout the economy. 
To summarize, our overall results on the abnormal returns to targets and acquirers may 
be considered typical: they are consistent with the previous merger literature, which generally 
finds positive abnormal returns to the targets and negative abnormal returns to the acquirers 
around merger announcement dates.  In our examination of the combined abnormal returns of 
the portfolio, we find evidence consistent with our TBTF subsidy argument.  Specifically, we find 
positive abnormal returns for mergers that allow the combined banking firm enhanced access to 
the federal safety net as the banking organizations become clearly TBTF (Case 1) or become 
systematically important to the overall economy (Case 3). 
 
Bond Market Reactions 
Our finding of a significant TBTF subsidy is supported not only by evidence from the 
stock market’s reactions but also the bond market’s reactions.  In examining bond spreads for 
banking organizations, we include only subordinated bonds in order to ensure that the bonds 
would be priced by the market according to risk, and that they are not federally guaranteed.  In 
addition, these bonds are straight bonds (that is, nonconvertible and noncallable).  For each 
category of TBTF mergers, we use subordinated bonds that were issued by the acquiring banks 
before and after the merger.  The bond data and characteristics that we use in this examination 
are those used in Penas and Unal (2004).
14 
We define sub-debt spread as the yield on the subordinated-bond minus the yield of a 
Treasury bond with a similar maturity.  As in Penas and Unal (2004), these sub-debt spreads,   30
OfferSpread, are regressed on the various bond characteristics and the characteristics of the 
banking organization that issue the bonds, using the following equation: 
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where MATURITY is the natural logarithm of years of maturity; CALL is the natural logarithm of 
the years with call protection; SUB is a binary variable that is equal to one if the bond is 
subordinated, zero otherwise; ISSUESIZE is the natural logarithm of the size of the issue; 
MARKET is the difference between the Merrill Lynch index of bond returns for the financial 
sector, excluding banks, and the 10-year Treasury bond rate; VOLATILITY is the volatility of the 
banking organization’s equity return one year before the issue date for the bond issued before 
the merger announcement date and the volatility of the portfolio of the two merging banking 
organizations for bonds issued after the merger announcement date; FINLEV is the market 
value of financial leverage; NONPERFORM is the percentage of nonperforming loans over total 
assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s pre-merger total assets; RATING is the 
bond rating of each bond; and MERGER is a binary variable that is equal to one if issued post-
merger, zero otherwise. In addition to these characteristics, we also include in the regression 
analysis our three TBTF indicators (DBECOMETBTF, DACQUIRERTBTF, and DBOTHTBTF), each 
interacted with MERGER to capture the three TBTF cases.   
The results of the analysis are reported in Table 5, where the robust t-statistics (with 
White’s correction) are reported in parentheses.  Column 1 presents the regression of sub-debt 
spreads with bond characteristics, issuer characteristics, and other control factors.    In column 
2, the three additional indicators are also included in the analysis to capture the impact of being 
TBTF on the sub-debt spreads (the issuer’s funding cost).  These variables are the TBTF 
indicators interacting with the variable MERGER, so that the variable MERGER* DBECOMETBTF 
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is equal to 1 if the acquirer becomes TBTF after the merger and the observed spreads are for 
the subordinated bonds issued by the acquirer after the merger.  We find the coefficient of this 
variable to be negative and significant, providing evidence that the acquirers were able to issue 
subordinated bonds at a significantly lower rate after becoming TBTF through the merger than 
they were able to prior to the merger.   
As expected, the coefficient of the variable MERGER* DACQUIRERTBTF is not 
significantly different from zero, indicating that for those acquirers who were already TBTF prior 
to the merger, their acquisition of a non-TBTF target does not lower their funding cost, since 
sub-debt spreads do not change significantly between before and after the merger.  The 
coefficient of MERGER* DBOTHTBTF is positive and weakly significant (almost missing the 10 
percent level of significance), indicating that, for mergers between two TBTF banking 
organizations, there may be an increase in funding cost to the TBTF acquirers after merging 
with another TBTF banking organization, probably due to the possible complexity of combining 
two very large institutions with different corporate cultures.  Overall, the analysis of subordinated 
bond spreads before and after becoming TBTF supports our finding of a significant subsidy to 
TBTF banking organizations.   
 
VI. How Much Are the Potential TBTF Subsidies Worth to Banks? 
Our empirical results suggest that banking organizations are willing to pay an added 
premium for mergers that will take them across the TBTF size thresholds.  This additional 
amount of purchase premium could provide some indication of the overall value of the benefits 
an organization will get as it becomes TBTF.  While the additional premiums could also be tied 
to something other than more favorable regulatory treatment for large banks, we have controlled 
for these impacts related to size and economies of scale  in the regression model.  Even if we 
use the most conservative approach of allowing for a broader range of TBTF benefits, there are   32
reasons why the added premiums we estimated might still understate the true value of potential 
subsidies to these large banks. 
First, the overall benefits to large banking organizations might be expected to accrue to 
several parties other than just the stockholders of the target organization.  A substantial portion 
of the benefits, for instance, could go to the stockholders of the acquiring organization and to 
bondholders (as suggested by the bond spread results) and uninsured depositors of both the 
target and the acquirer.  An acquiring organization and its stockholders are likely to have the 
bargaining power to retain many of the TBTF benefits, particularly since this organization may 
be able to select from a variety of acquisition targets or combinations of targets in reaching the 
desired size threshold.  To the extent that this is true, the value of any retained benefits should 
be reflected in greater investor interest and a higher market price for the acquirer’s stock.  The 
uninsured depositors and possibly the bondholders of both the target and acquiring 
organizations would also anticipate receiving greater protection once they become part of a 
TBTF organization, and the value of this protection would be an additional benefit (not 
accounted for in our study).  
Second, another factor that could lead to our under-estimation of the TBTF benefits is 
that investors may try to anticipate which acquisition targets would provide a good stepping 
stone for organizations trying to become TBTF.  These investors may bid up the price of such 
targets well in advance of the 20-, 40-, and 60-day windows we use to capture purchase 
premiums, thereby leading to lower estimated values for the additional purchase premiums.
15  
Third, our estimation of the total TBTF premium that the acquiring banks have paid does not 
include several bank mergers that brought the combined banking organization over the TBTF 
threshold, since the mergers occurred prior to the start of our sample period (several merger 
parties were already TBTF prior to our sample period). Consequently, while acquirers may pay   33
greater purchase premiums to capture the expected benefits of TBTF, a number of factors   
suggest that these added premiums may only be a starting point or lower bound for estimating 
the overall TBTF subsidies. 
Based on our estimation of equation (2) and the regression coefficients estimated using 
a 20-day purchase premium (reported in Table 3), we calculate the TBTF premiums that are 
associated with the coefficients on the following variables -- DBECOMETBTF, DACQUIRERTBTF, 
DACQUIRERTBTF * TAt, DBOTHTBTF,  DBOTHTBTF * TAt,  and DBOTHTBTF * COVt,a for each of the 
merger deals.  The specification is described in equations (3), (4), and (5) below.   
Subsidy (Become TBTF)      = b31                                         (3) 
Subsidy (Acquirer is already TBTF)  = b32 + b33 (TAt)                                         (4) 
Subsidy (Acquirer and Target are already TBTF) 
= b34 + b35 (TAt) + b36 (COVt,a)                    (5) 
 
where  b31  is the coefficient estimate on DBECOMETBTF; b 32  is the coefficient estimate on 
DACQUIRERTBTF; b33 is the coefficient estimate on DACQUIRERTBTF * TAt;  b34 is the coefficient 
estimate on DBOTHTBTF; b35  is the coefficient estimate on DBOTHTBTF * TAt;  and  b36  is the 
coefficient estimate on DBOTHTBTF * COVt,a. 
Table 6 presents our estimated total dollar value of the TBTF premiums for all the 
merger deals in our sample, which include bank mergers during 1991-2004.  The dollar value of 
the TBTF premium is calculated for each TBTF category, based on three different TBTF 
thresholds: $100 billion in book value of total assets, the 11 largest banking organizations, and 
$20 billion market capitalization. 
Becoming TBTF.  The estimated TBTF premiums paid to benefit from crossing the TBTF 
threshold are presented in column 1 of Table 6, and they are calculated using the Subsidy 
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advance.  We find that the regressions that use 40- and 60-day windows for calculating bid premiums   34
(Become TBTF) in equation (3).  The top panel presents the estimated TBTF premiums using 
the threshold of $100 billion book value of total assets, which includes eight merger deals.  The 
combined excess purchase premiums paid by these eight acquirers to become TBTF range 
from $14.1 billion (60-day window) to $17.1 billion (20-day window).  These becoming TBTF 
premiums represent a significant portion of the overall purchased premiums offered by these 
eight acquiring banks.  Total offered premiums for these eight merger deals range from $22.4 
billion (20-day window) to $30.5 billion (60-day window).
16  Specifically, our estimated becoming 
TBTF premiums account for 46 percent (for the 60-day window) to 76 percent (for the 20-day 
window) of total purchase premiums that the eight acquiring banks offered to pay.    
The middle and lower panels report these becoming TBTF premiums when using other 
TBTF thresholds, using the $20 billion market capitalization threshold in the middle panel and 
using the 11 largest banking organizations threshold in the bottom panel.  These premiums 
represent the additional TBTF value that was given to shareholders of the target bank, and by 
no means do they represent the total TBTF benefits that are likely to be captured by other 
parties, including the shareholders, bondholders, and other creditors of the targets and the 
acquirers.  Thus, these estimates can be interpreted as a lower bound value of the TBTF 
subsidies. 
Acquirer Already TBTF.  In addition to the premiums paid to become TBTF, we also 
calculate those TBTF-related premiums paid by already TBTF acquirers, which could still 
increase their TBTF subsidies by expanding their asset base and network (column 2) and 
becoming clearly systematically important banking organizations (column 3).   
Column 2 of Table 6 presents the purchase premiums that the TBTF acquirers paid to 
acquire non-TBTF targets, using Subsidy (Acquirer is already TBTF) in equation (4).  Again, the 
purchased premiums are calculated for the three different TBTF thresholds, with 29, 21, and 33 
                                                                                                                                                             
have greater explanatory power than those using just 20-day windows.   
16  Total offered premium equals the offer price times the number of shares of the target.   35
merger deals included for the top panel ($100 billion book value of total assets threshold), the 
middle panel ($20 billion market capitalization threshold), and the bottom panel (the 11 largest 
banking organizations threshold), respectively.  These TBTF premiums are related to the size of 
the target banks, since larger purchase premiums are paid to acquire targets that would provide 
greater opportunity for the TBTF acquirers to expand their deposit base.  The estimated total 
TBTF premiums range from about $15 billion to $25 billion. 
Column 3 of Table 6 presents the calculated excess purchase premiums that already 
TBTF acquirers paid to acquire TBTF targets, using Subsidy (Acquirer and Target are already 
TBTF) in equation (5).  The calculated purchase premiums paid to shareholders of TBTF targets 
range from about $5 billion to $30 billion, depending on the TBTF definition and the windows for 
premium calculation.  Consistent with our earlier results on the stock market’s reactions, which 
rewarded this type of merger between two TBTF banking organizations, we find that these 
mergers create values to the target and the combined banking organizations. 
Overall TBTF Subsidies.  Overall, our results indicate that significant benefits accrue to 
TBTF banking organizations.  It is important to point out that these estimated TBTF benefits 
represent a lower bound estimate of the actual TBTF subsidies, since our calculation could not 
include the benefits that have been captured by some organizations, such as Bank of America 
Corporation and Citigroup, which were already TBTF prior to our study period.  In addition, our 
calculated TBTF benefits are those that accrue to shareholders of the targets only; they do not 
include benefits that accrue to shareholders of the acquiring banking organization and 
bondholders and other creditors of the target and the acquiring banking organizations.  The true 
value of the potential TBTF benefits, therefore, is expected to be larger than the estimates 
presented in this paper. 
 
 
   36
VII. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
The special treatment provided to too-big-to-fail institutions during the financial crisis that 
started in mid-2007 has raised concerns among analysts and legislators about the 
consequences of this for the overall stability and riskiness of the financial system.  Stern 
(2009a) testified before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs that “TBTF 
arises when the uninsured creditors of systemically important financial institutions expect 
government protection from loss … If creditors continue to expect special protection, the moral 
hazard of government protection will continue.  That is, creditors will continue to underprice the 
risk-taking of these financial institutions, overfund them, and fail to provide effective market 
discipline.  Facing prices that are too low, systemically important firms will take on too much 
risk.  Excessive risk-taking squanders valuable economic resources and, in the extreme, leads 
to financial crises that impose substantial losses on taxpayers.” 
It was unclear after FDICIA and before the financial crisis whether some banking 
organizations were TBTF.  It is now evident that being viewed by the market (and regulators) as 
being TBTF, being too interconnected, or being systematically important to the economy could 
add significant value to banking firms.  Since there has never been an official published list or 
definition of TBTF banking organizations, the value of potential TBTF benefits is determined by 
the market’s perception. This paper attempts to examine the market’s perception of the TBTF 
thresholds and the potential value of subsidies provided to TBTF banking institutions. 
Our empirical results are consistent with the hypothesis that large banking organizations 
obtain advantages not available to other organizations.  These advantages may include 
becoming TBTF and thus gaining favor with uninsured bank creditors and other market 
participants, operating with lower regulatory costs, and increasing the organization’s chances of 
receiving regulatory forbearance.
17  We find that banking organizations are willing to pay an 
                                                 
17  For further discussion on regulatory forbearance when the banking system is weak and when there are 
“too many to fail,” see Brown and Dinc (2009) and Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007).   37
added premium for mergers that will put them over a TBTF threshold.  This added premium 
amounted to an estimated $14 billion to $17 billion extra that eight banking organizations in our 
data set were willing to pay for acquisitions that enabled them to become TBTF (crossing the 
$100 billion book value of total assets threshold).   
While these amounts are large, they are likely to underestimate the total value of the 
benefits that accrue to large banking organizations. Organizations seeking to obtain TBTF 
benefits are not likely to be forced by the marketplace to pass on anywhere near the full value of 
these benefits to the shareholders of their acquisition targets. In addition, these estimated 
benefits apply only to the organizations that became TBTF during our study period.  Benefits 
already obtained by banking organizations that became TBTF prior to our sample period thus 
would not be included in our TBTF benefit calculations.  As a result, the total subsidy value to 
TBTF banking organizations could easily be much higher than what we estimate. 
These estimates provide an aggregate measure of the benefits accruing to large banking 
organizations from exceeding a TBTF threshold and do not indicate the relative contribution of 
any particular regulatory advantage or individual policy.  By themselves, our results do not point 
out which particular policy directions would be most effective in addressing the benefits that 
large banking organizations may obtain once they become TBTF.  However, our estimates of 
the benefits from exceeding a TBTF threshold appear large enough to cause increasing 
concerns as the megamerger trend continues in the U.S. banking industry.  These trends could 
hinder the efficient allocation of financial resources across different sizes of institutions and, in 
turn, their customers and the overall macro-economy.
18    
Should these TBTF banking institutions be required to pay for the privilege?  If so, 
should they be required to hold more capital (and contingent capital that would be converted to 
equity capital when needed) and/or be assessed higher FDIC insurance premiums than other 
banks?  Since these payments could not be assessed to TBTF and systemically important   38
banking organizations under the current regime of constructive ambiguity, should the TBTF list 
be made publicly available?  Should systemically important nonbank organizations also be 
assessed similar payments?  These are policy questions for further research.
19  Our findings 
lead us to be concerned and cautious as the number of assisted mergers between weak TBTF 
financial institutions continues to grow through the financial crisis that started in mid-2007, 
resulting in TBTF banking organizations becoming even bigger than before the beginning of the 
crisis.  Furthermore, a few of the recent assisted mergers were between TBTF banks and 
nonbank financial institutions, thus extending the federal safety net related to TBTF to cover 





                                                                                                                                                             
18  See Hoenig (1999) and Carow, Kane, and Narayanan (2006) for further discussion. 
19  See Blinder (2009), Stern (2009a and 2009b), and Stern and Feldman (2009) for the most recent 
policy reform discussion.     39
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Table 1 
Recent Evidence of the Value of Having Access to the Federal Safety Net 
 
 
Panel A:  Cumulative abnormal returns around Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s 
announcement of capital support for major U.S. banking organizations, window [-1, +1] 
 
This table reports statistics for the cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the October 14, 2008 
announcement of the United States Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson that government will use the 
TARP funds to injection equity capital in major U.S. banking organizations. For each portfolio of banking 
organizations, excess return in the event window date k is the coefficient 
k p,   in the following model, 
estimated by seemingly unrelated regression: 
t p k
k
k p t m p p t p D R R ,
1
1
, , ,         
 
  
t p R ,  is the stock return of portfolio p on day t; 
p  is the intercept coefficient for portfolio p;  mt R is the 
market index for day t; 
p  is the market risk coefficient for portfolio p;  k D is a binary variable that equals 1 
if day t is equal to the announcement day or window k ( ] 1 , 1 [    k ), zero otherwise; 
k p,  is the event 
coefficient for portfolio p; and 
t p,  is a random error. October 14, 2008 is defined as the event day [0]. We 
examine cumulative excess return over the three-day event window [-1, +1]. The row labeled “Cumulative 
abnormal returns over the window [-1, +1]” reports the sum of the 
k p,   for each asset-size group of 
banking organizations. The numbers in parentheses report the p-value for statistical significant. 
1
0 H  tests 
the hypothesis that the cumulative abnormal returns are jointly equal to zero for the announcement. 
2
0 H tests the hypothesis that the cumulative abnormal returns are jointly equal to each. The s '
2  statistics 
provide a test statistic to determine statistical significance.  
The *** and ** denote significance at the 1% level and the 5% level, respectively. 
 
  Portfolio of 10 Large 
Banking Org. that 
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Org. with Book Total 
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Source:  Brewer and Klingenhagen (2009)   44
 
Table 1 (Cont’d) 
Recent Evidence of the Value of Having Access to the Federal Safety Net 
 
 
Panel B: Market Reactions to the Extension of Federal Assistance to Investment Banks 
 
This panel reports the abnormal returns for three portfolios of organizations for three difference event 
dates: March 14, when the Federal Reserve System (FRS) announced that it would open the discount 
window to lend to investment banking firms; March 17, when JPMorgan Chase and Co. (JPMC) 
announced that it would acquire Bear Stearns for $2 per share with Federal assistance; and March 18, 
when Lehman Brothers Holdings and Goldman Sachs Group announced better than expected earnings. 
The three portfolios are: (1) a portfolio of 4 investment banking firms (Morgan Stanley; Merrill Lynch; 
Lehman Brothers Holdings; and Goldman Sachs Group); (2) a portfolio of the top 11 domestic banking 
organizations in the National Information Center’s (NIC) 50 largest bank holding companies (BHCs) list; 
and (3) the remaining 16 domestic banking organizations in the NIC’s top 50 BHC list. For each portfolio 
of banking organizations, abnormal return on the event date k is the coefficient 
k p,   in the following 
model, estimated by seemingly unrelated regression: 
t p k
k
k p t m p p t p D R R ,
3
1
, , ,         
 
  
t p R ,  is the stock return of portfolio p on day t; 
p  is the intercept coefficient for portfolio p;  mt R is the 
market index for day t; 
p   is the market risk coefficient for portfolio p;  k D is a binary variable that equals 
1 if day t is equal to the announcement day k ( ] 3   and   , 2   , 1 [  k ), zero otherwise; 
k p,  is the event 
coefficient for portfolio p; and 
t p,  is a random error.  The numbers in parentheses beneath the abnormal 
returns are the t-statistics. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Characteristics for 411 Bank Acquisitions  
Announced During the Period 1991-2004 
 
Panel A:  Variable Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for the Entire Sample.  
Characteristics 
 
Mnemonic Mean  Median  Maximum  Std.  Dev. 
Purchase premium over stock price 20 days 
before 
 
PREM20 8.6393  6.7900 61.4150 8.0070 
Purchase premium over stock price 40 days 
before 
 
PREM40 9.5509  7.7000 67.3827 9.0845 
Purchase premium over stock price 60 days 
before 
 
PREM60 10.0055  8.2550  76.3125  9.9497 
Acquirer total assets prior to offer (Million) 
 
TAa $37,186  $13,428  $1,057,657  $90,350 
Target total assets prior to offer (Million) 
 
TAt $8,703  $1,265  $326,563  $29,887 
The variance of return on assets of the target 
over the 13 quarters before the quarter of the 
merger announcement date x 10,000  
 
 
VROAt 0.0326  0.0084 1.2106  0.1103 
The target’s ratio of market value of common 
to the book value of common in the quarter 





MVBVt 1.7333 1.6200 17.4862  1.1225 
The target’s Beta (measure of systematic 
risk) calculated from  daily stock returns for 
the period beginning 300 days prior to the 




BETAt 0.4760 0.4126  2.0084 0.4619 
Growth rate of total assets of the target over 
the 13 quarters before the quarter of the 
merger announcement date 
 
 
GTAt  0.4427 0.3342  7.9598 0.6352 
The variance of return on assets of the 
acquirer over the 13 quarters before the 





VROAa 0.0179 0.0141 0.3775 0.0242 
The acquirer’s ratio of market value of 
common to the book value of common in the 





MVBVa  2.2310 1.9554 37.2474  1.9801 
The acquirer’s Beta (measure of systematic 
risk) calculated from  daily stock returns for 
the period beginning 300 days prior to the 




BETAa  0.7859 0.8121  2.1594 0.4398 
Growth rate of total assets of the acquirer 
over the 13 quarters before the quarter of the 
merger announcement date 
 
 
GTAa  0.8473 0.6171 19.9130  1.3589 
The acquirer’s book value of capital-to-asset 




CRATIOa  0.0819 0.0807  0.1497 0.0150 
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Covariance of the return on assets of the 
target and acquirer over the 13quarters 





COVt,a  0.0032 0.0008  0.0313  0.0069 
Target assets / Acquirer assets 
 
Relative  0.2936 0.1738  1.7636 0.3442 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if the acquirer 




Instate  0.4526 0  1 0.4984 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if it is a merger 
of equal 
 
MOE  0.0487 0  1 0.2154 
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Panel B:  Summary Statistics for Key Variables – Comparing Across TBTF Groups 
 
 
Min Max  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Median 
 
Case 1:  Become TBTF 
 
PREM20 0.8300  61.4150  20.0191  21.6658  13.4350 
 
PREM40 0.5800  67.3827  27.9800  28.5683  13.2475 
 
PREM60 -1.7950  75.1947  28.2221  29.1866  13.4350 
 
TAt  $35,402 $94,820 $63,104 $20,623  $58,198 
 
TAa  $48,051 $99,066 $73,238 $18,670  $74,318 
 
BETAt  0.7700 2.0084 1.3280 0.3644  1.2971 
 
BETAa  0.9015 1.9350 1.2532 0.3913  1.1420 
 
VROAt  0.0009 0.1816 0.0492 0.0674  0.0170 
 
VROAa  0.0053 0.0324 0.0187 0.0104  0.0173 
 












-9.6400 29.3850 9.8845  8.3512  7.9463 
 
TAt  $257 $81,219  $23,574  $24,764  $16,836 
 
TAa  $104,554 $1,057,657 $211,442  $175,068 $182,557 
 
BETAt  -0.0918 1.9895 0.8118 0.5134 0.7580 
 
BETAa  0.7319 1.7800 1.2298 0.2679  1.2511 
 
VROAt  0.0004 0.0994 0.0131 0.0198  0.0063 
 
VROAa  0.0008 0.1097 0.0160 0.0202  0.0140 
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Case 3:  Both Already TBTF 
 
PREM20 2.9250  46.3125  15.5813  16.0898  11.3550 
 
PREM40 8.9300  62.2500  21.4153  20.4770  13.5175 
 
PREM60 8.4250  76.3125  25.1966  25.6109  16.4985 
 
TAt  $114,804 $326,563 $214,732 $86,334 $230,972 
 
TAa  $116,862 $770,912 $418,965  $277,663  $355,274 
 
BETAt  0.9082 1.8066 1.2201  0.3287  1.0905 
 
BETAa  0.9828 1.7616 1.2504  0.2686  1.1862 
 
VROAt  0.0002 0.0521 0.0138  0.0198  0.0048 
 
VROAa  0.0054 0.0333 0.0155  0.0096  0.0140 
 
Case 4: Base Case -- No TBTF 
 
PREM20 -6.0950  60.7500  8.2866  7.2525  6.7900 
 
PREM40 -4.7200  64.0000  8.9798  7.4940  7.4400 
 
PREM60 -30.0200  67.2500  9.3700  8.2871  8.1250 
 
TAt  $44 $40,136  $2,933  $5,479  $1,096 
 
TAa  $127 $98,640  $15,914  $17,194  $9,768 
 
BETAt  -1.0800 1.9630 0.4178 0.4201 0.3676 
 
BETAa  -0.2801 2.1594 0.7318 0.4239 0.7596 
 
VROAt  0.00002 1.2106  0.0342 0.1160 0.0085 
 
VROAa  0.0001 0.3775 0.0180  0.0249  0.0143 
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Table 3 
Cross-sectional determinants of the 20-day purchase premium 
The dependent variable in these regressions is the 20-day purchase premium of a target bank ($ 
million) computed as the offer price less pre-consolidation market value 20-trading days before the 
announcement date. The first column reports estimates using the $100 billion total assets threshold for 
TBTF institutions; the second column reports estimates using the 11 largest banking organizations as the 
threshold for TBTF; and the third column reports estimates using the $20 billion market value 
capitalization threshold for TBTF institutions. DBECOMETBTF is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
acquirer and the target are both not TBTF prior to the merger, but the combined banking firm will become 
TBTF after the merger, and zero otherwise; DACQUIRERTBTF is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
acquirer is already TBTF prior to the merger but the target is not TBTF, and zero otherwise; DBOTHTBTF is         
indicator variable equal to 1 if both the acquirer and the target are already TBTF prior to the merger, and 
zero otherwise; VROAa (VROAt) is the variance of the return on total assets of the acquirer (target) over 
the 13 quarters prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date; MVBVa (MVBVt) is the ratio of 
market value of common to the book value of common of the acquirer (target) in the quarter prior to the 
quarter of the merger announcement date; BETAa (BETAt) is the acquirer’s (target’s) Beta (measure of 
systematic risk) calculated from daily stock returns for the period beginning 300 days prior to the merger, 
using the one-factor market model; GTAa (GTAt) is the growth rate of total assets of the acquirer (target) 
over the 13 quarters prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date; TAt is the book value total 
assets of the target; CRATIOa is the book value of capital-to-asset ratio of the acquirer in the quarter prior 
to the quarter of the merger announcement date; COVt,a  is the covariance of the ROA of the target and 
acquirer over the 13 quarters prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date; Relative is the ratio 
of target’s total assets to acquirer’s total assets; Instate is an indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer 
and the target are in the same state, and zero otherwise; Moe is an indicator variable equal to one if it is a 
merger of equal, and zero otherwise. Sample Period: 1991-2004 (N=411). The year and regional fixed 
effects are also included in the estimation but are not reported.   The t-statistics using heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors are reported in the parentheses.  The ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
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Target’s Characteristics:   
























Acquirer’s Characteristics:   






























Target-Acquirer Relation:   












Deal Characteristics:   














76.87% 79.25% 79.99%   51
Table 4 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns around merger announcement date 
 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the event windows [-1, +1] and [-1, 0] for 
targets, acquirers, and portfolio of targets and acquirers around the merger announcement date over the 
period 1991-2004 for three TBTF cases using the $100 billion total assets threshold. The first panel 
provides the results for the merger combinations where the acquirer and the target are both not TBTF 
prior to the merger, but the combined banking firm will become TBTF after the merger; the second panel 
provides the results for the merger combinations where the acquirer is already TBTF prior to the merger 
but the target is not TBTF; and the third panel provides the results for the merger combinations where 
both the acquirer and the target are already TBTF prior to the merger. We use standard event study 
methodology to compute abnormal return (ARi,t) for event day t.  See Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) for 
a discussion of this methodology.  Following Houston and Ryngaert (1994), we define portfolio abnormal 
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where MVT,-20 is the market value of the target firm twenty days before the merger bid for the target, MVA,-
20 is the market value of the acquirer firm twenty days before the merger bid for the target.   The variance 
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where A,T, is the estimated correlation coefficient between acquirer and target market model residuals 
obtained over the estimation period, 
i A n is the number of days in the acquirer abnormal return window, 
and 
i T n is the number of days in the target abnormal return window. The Z-statistics are in parentheses 
below the abnormal returns. 
 
 
Panel 1:  Both targets and acquirers become TBTF after the merger – 8 observations 









Chemical Banking Corp. 
NCNB Corp, Charlotte, NC 
First Union Corp, Charlotte, NC 
NBD Bancorp, Detroit, MI 
Wells Fargo & Co. 
Washington Mutual Inc., Seattle 
Norwest Corp 
Firstar Corp, Milwaukee 
Manufacturers Hanover Corp. 
C&S/Sovran Corp. 
First Fidelity Bancorporation 
First Chicago Corp, Illinois 
First Interstate Bancorp 
Ahmanson H.F. & Co., Irwindale, CA 
Wells Fargo 
U.S. Bancorp, Minneapolis 
Event window             Target                                    Acquirer                                  Combined 
                                     15.54                                      -0.40                                           6.60 
[-1, +1]                       (15.69)                                      (0.40)                                          (7.79) 
                                     14.67                                       1.00                                           6.10 
[-1, 0]                         (18.28)                                      (1.32)                                          (9.63)   52
 
Panel 2:  Acquirers are already TBTF prior to the merger – 30 observations 































Bank America Corp 
Bank America Corp  
NationsBank Corp 




First Union Corp 
NationsBank Corp  
First Union Corp 
NationsBank Corp 
First Union Corp 
First Union Corp 
NationsBank Corp 
Banc One Corp 
First Union Corp 





Washington Mutual  
FleetBoston Financial Group 
First Union Corp 
Washington Mutual Inc. 
Citigroup  
Wells Fargo  
National City Corp  
SunTrust Banks Inc.  
Wachovia Corp 
Valley Capital Corp  
Security Pacific 
MNC Financial 
Continental Bank Corp 
RHNB Corp 
Intercontinental Bank 
Bank South Corp 
Home Financial Corp 
Charter Bancshares Inc  
Center Financial Corp 
Boatmen’s Bancshares Inc. 




CoreStates Financial Corp 
BankBoston  
National Bancorp AK 
First Security Corp 
First Commerce Bancshares 
Brenton Banks Inc 
Bank United Corp 
Summit Bancorp Princeton 
Wachovia Corp 
Dime Bancorp NY 
Golden State Bancorp  
Pacific Northwest Bancorp  
Provident Financial Group  
National Commerce Financial Corp 
SouthTrust Corp 
Event window             Target                                    Acquirer                                  Combined 
                                    11.94                                          -1.87                                          -0.16 
[-1, +1]                       (21.42)                                       (-5.17)                                        (-1.23) 
                                    10.24                                          -1.63                                            -0.07 
[-1, 0]                        (24.10)                                       (-4.92)                                           (-0.26) 
 
Panel 3: Both acquirers and targets are TBTF prior to the merger – 6 observations 








Banc One Corp (Columbus, OH) 
NationsBank 
Chase Manhattan Corp 
BankAmerica 
J.P. Morgan Chase & Co 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
First Chicago NBD Corp 
BankAmerica Corp 
J.P. Morgan & Co 
FleetBoston Financial Corp 
Bank One Corp (Chicago) 
Event window              Target                                       Acquirer                                     Combined 
                                 10.69                                         -1.72                                           1.73 
[-1, +1]                       (12.17)                                       (-2.24)                                        (2.52) 
                                   9.45                                         1.17                                            3.23 
[-1, 0]                         (12.04)                                       (0.42)                                          (4.27)   53
Table 5 
Bond market reactions to bank mergers—analysis of the offer spread 
 
 
This table presents the relation between the offer spread and various bond and issuers characteristics 
and banking organization characteristics of the banking organization that issue the bonds, The dependent 
variable is defined as the difference between yield on the subordinated-bond minus the yield of a 
Treasury bond with a similar maturity. MATURITY is the natural logarithm of years of maturity; CALL is 
the natural logarithm of the years with call protection; SUB is a binary variable that is equal to one if the 
bond is subordinated, zero otherwise; ISSUESIZE is the natural logarithm of the size of the issue; 
MARKET is the difference between Merrill Lynch index of bond returns for the financial sector, excluding 
banks, and the 10-year Treasury bond rate; VOLATILITY is the volatility of the banking organization’s 
equity return one year before the issue date for the bond issued before the merger announcement date 
and the volatility of the portfolio of the two merging banking organizations for bonds issued after the 
merger announcement date; FINLEV is the market value of financial leverage; NONPERFORM is the 
percentage of non-performing loans over total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s pre-
merger total assets; RATING is the bond rating of each bond; and MERGER is a binary variable that is 
equal to one if issued post-merger, zero otherwise. In addition to these characteristics, we also include in 
the regression analysis our three TBTF dummy indicators (DBECOMETBTF, DACQUIRERTBTF, and 
DBOTHTBTF) each interacted with MERGER to capture the three TBTF cases. DBECOMETBTF is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer and the target are both not TBTF prior to the merger, but the 
combined banking firm will become TBTF after the merger, and zero otherwise; DACQUIRERTBTF is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer is already TBTF prior to the merger but the target is not 
TBTF, and zero otherwise; and DBOTHTBTF is  indicator variable equal to 1 if both the acquirer and the 
target are  already TBTF prior to the merger, and zero otherwise. Robust t-statistics (with White’s 
Correction) are reported in parentheses. The ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.   
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Table 6 
Estimated Dollar Value ($ Million in year 2005) of TBTF Premiums 
Using Various TBTF Thresholds 
 
 
The estimated TBTF premiums are calculated based on the coefficient estimates generated from 
estimation of our purchase premium equations for 20-, 40-, and 60-day windows. We only use those 
coefficients that are significant at the 10% level or higher. We calculate the TBTF premiums that are 
associated with the coefficients on the following variables: DBECOMETBTF,  DACQUIRERTBTF,  
D_Acquirer_TBTF * TAt, DBOTHTBTF,  DBOTHTBTF * TAt,  and DBOTHTBTF * COVt,a for each of the merger 
deals.  The specifications are described in following equations:   
 
Subsidy (Become TBTF)      = b31                               
Subsidy (Acquirer is already TBTF)  = b32 + b33 (TAt)                                  
Subsidy (Acquirer and Target are already TBTF) 
= b34 + b35 (TAt) + b36 (COVt,a)         
 
DBECOMETBTF is an indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer and the target are both not TBTF prior 
to the merger, but the combined banking firm will become TBTF after the merger, and zero otherwise; 
DACQUIRERTBTF is an indicator variable equal to one if the acquirer is already TBTF prior to the merger 
but the target is not TBTF, and zero otherwise; DBOTHTBTF is an indicator variable equal to 1 if both the 
acquirer and the target are already TBTF prior to the merger, and zero otherwise; TAt is the book value 
total assets of the target; COVt,a  is the covariance of the ROA of the target and acquirer over the 13 
quarters prior to the quarter of the merger announcement date; b31  is the coefficient estimate on 
DBECOMETBTF; b 32  is the coefficient estimate on DACQUIRERTBTF; b33  is the coefficient estimate on 
DACQUIRERTBTF * TAt;  b34 is the coefficient estimate on DBOTHTBTF; b35 is the coefficient estimate on 
DBOTHTBTF * TAt; and b36 is the coefficient estimate on DBOTHTBTF * COVt,a. 
 
 
  Becomes TBTF After 
the Merger 
Acquirer Already TBTF 
Prior to the Merger 
Acquirer and Target 
Already TBTF Prior To 
the Merger 
 




Offered purchase premium  
Estimated TBTF premium 
  
40-day Premium: 
Offered purchase premium  
Estimated TBTF premium  
 
20-day Premium: 
Offered purchase premium  
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Offered purchase premium  
Estimated TBTF premium  
 
40-day Premium: 
Offered purchase premium  
Estimated TBTF premium  
 
20-day Premium: 
Offered purchase premium  






















































Offered purchase premium  
Estimated TBTF premium  
 
40-day Premium: 
Offered purchase premium  
Estimated TBTF premium  
 
20-day Premium: 
Offered purchase premium  
Estimated TBTF premium 
 
N=9 
 
 
 
$20,171.28 
$9,491.40 
 
 
$20,415.44 
$13,197.68 
 
 
$19,023.49 
$13,257.63 
 
N=33 
 
 
 
$41,823.35 
$17,080.12 
 
 
$40,560.84 
$22,267.63 
 
 
$39,129.13 
$25,621.21 
 
N=8 
 
 
 
$75,751.24 
$5,541.35 
 
 
$65,217.01 
$10,354.63 
 
 
$47,281.84 
$13,697.73 
 
 
 